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This article adopts a multiple streams approach to examine the failure to implement minimum unit 
pricing (MUP) for alcohol in England. It demonstrates that the multiple streams model provides a 
valuable conceptual tool for explaining how and why policies are, and are not, enacted. However, 
it inds that while problem streams and policy streams are useful heuristic devices, in practice 
they may overlap and be mutually constitutive. The case of MUP also highlights the potential for 
policy spillover between jurisdictions and different policy contexts, showing both limits to, and the 
complex nature of, these processes. It shows the need for high level political commitment in order 
to implement controversial policies, even when they are backed by strong supporting evidence. 
Furthermore, it highlights the importance of civil society actors not just in bringing policy issues 
onto the agenda, but in supporting governments in adopting measures to address them.
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Introduction
In March 2012, the Conservative–Liberal Democrat coalition government announced 
its intention to introduce minimum unit pricing (MUP) for alcohol in England in 
The Government’s Alcohol Strategy (GAS) (HM Government, 2012):
We will introduce a minimum unit price (MUP) for alcohol meaning that, 
for the irst time ever in England and Wales, alcohol will not be allowed to 
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be sold below a certain deined price. We will consult on the level in the 
coming months with a view to introducing legislation as soon as possible.
This commitment followed the adoption of similar measures by the Scottish 
government (2008), although it had been little trailed in advance of the strategy 
launch, taking well-placed policy actors inside and outside government by surprise. 
In addition, it followed the introduction of the Public Health Responsibility Deal 
(PHRD) in March 2011 (Department of Health, 2011) and the regulation represented 
a fundamentally diferent approach to addressing alcohol related harms to the PHRD, 
which was designed as a close partnership with industry actors. Just 16 month later, 
in July 2013, the government announced to Parliament that it was placing its plans to 
introduce MUP on hold indeinitely (Browne, 2013). There have been no subsequent 
moves towards the introduction of MUP in England to date.
This article draws on semi-structured interviews with key policy actors and Kingdon’s 
(1984) multiple streams approach (MSA) to the policy process to understand how and 
why MUP was adopted as a policy in 2012, and why this decision was reversed so soon 
after. The article builds on previous journalistic and scholarly accounts of these policy 
events. While Gornall (2014) catalogues industry policy inluencing strategies to oppose 
MUP – drawing on studies by McCambridge et al (2014) and Katikireddi et al (2014b) 
– Nicholls and Greenaway (2015) employ the MSA in identifying structural characteristics 
of the alcohol policy debate – deinitional, ideological, systemic and evidentiary – which 
undermined eforts to introduce MUP. Here, we examine the factors underlying the 
policy decisions to adopt and discontinue MUP in England in this timeframe.
The article seeks to understand the MUP debate in the context of related policy 
developments in Westminster and beyond. First, the MUP debate must be understood 
against the backdrop of concurrent alcohol policy initiatives at Westminster, 
particularly the PHRD (Department of Health, 2011). The parallel development of 
these policies, which were associated with diferent parts of government (that is, the 
Department of Health in the case of the PHRD and the Cabinet Oice for MUP), 
reveals fundamental tensions at the heart of UK alcohol policy debates at this time 
which are essential to understanding subsequent policy outcomes.
In addition, developments on MUP in Scotland provide important context for 
– and at times overlap with – the policy process at Westminster. It is argued that 
the problem and policy streams developed symbiotically in England and Scotland, 
partly as a result of collaborations between civil-society actors in both contexts and 
involved important contributions from policy actors in London and Edinburgh. The 
key diferences between the English and Scottish debates, and the reasons for the 
failure of MUP in the latter context, lie instead in the political stream. As the MUP 
debates in Scotland have been examined in detail elsewhere (Holden and Hawkins, 
2012; Katikireddi et al, 2014a; 2014b; McCambridge et al, 2014), we do not engage 
with these again here. The central focus of this article is instead on the development 
of MUP in England, and events in Scotland are integrated into the analysis only 
where relevant to understanding the policy process at Westminster.
The MSA is employed here as a heuristic device, which, in identifying the alignment 
of problem, policy and political streams as ofering key moments for policy change, can 
provide a conceptual vocabulary for furthering our understanding of highly complex 
decision-making processes (Kingdon, 1984). While the article is empirically rather than 
theoretically driven, the case examined here is of wider relevance to policy scholars 
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more generally and contributes to the sizeable, and recently reinvigorated, literature 
on the MSA (Cairney and Jones, 2016; Rawat and Morris, 2016).
Theoretical perspective and methods
In Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policy, Kingdon (1984) attempted to understand 
the necessary conditions for policy change to occur; for a so-called ‘policy window’ 
to open. Kingdon’s (1984) starting point is the fundamental ambiguity of the policy 
process; that is, the potential for issues to be identiied and interpreted diferently in 
diferent contexts and by diferent actors and, therefore, enter onto the policy agenda 
in multiple ways and forms (Zahariadis, 2003). In attempting to explain how, in the 
context of this ambiguity, certain issues become politicised while others do not, and 
certain policy projects succeed where others fail, Kingdon identiied three ‘streams’ 
or elements of policy debates which are integral to these outcomes. First, the problem 
stream focuses on the identiication of an issue, or collection of issues, which become 
framed as ‘policy problems’; that is to say problems requiring governmental responses. 
Second, the policy stream relates to the development of potential policy responses to 
address the identiied problem(s). Third, the political stream refers to the political factors 
that need to align in order for the proposed solution to a policy problem to be enacted. 
Factors inluencing the political stream include the institutional setting and actors 
involved (that is, the right actors being in place in key ‘gatekeeping’ positions), the 
status of public opinion, the electoral cycle, the availability of resources and other 
factors which have an impact on the political commitments of key decision makers.
For policy change to occur all three streams need to converge to create a window of 
opportunity (Kingdon, 1984). However, while the convergence of these streams is a 
necessary condition for policy change, it is not suicient. Policymakers must still act to bring 
about policy change when the conditions allow this. Thus, while the MSA recognises the 
structural factors shaping policy decisions, the model highlights the key role of political 
agency. Within each stream diferent actors are of principle relevance. In the problem and 
policy streams, researchers, policy advocates, civil society organisations, stakeholders and 
vested interests are to the fore. In the political stream, it is decision makers – civil servants, 
administrators, government ministers and members of parliament – who are the key actors. 
In each of these streams, public opinion, the salience of policy issues and the popularity 
of proposed measures are important contextual factors throughout the policy process.
Kingdon (1984) identiies a key role for policy entrepreneurs, who may be located in 
government or civil society; who may bring problems and/or solutions onto the policy 
agenda; promote widespread public support for policy change; and/or inluence key 
decision makers to take policies forward (see also Mintrom and Norman, 2009). Policy 
entrepreneurship is associated with the idea of (sometimes dramatic or seismic) policy 
change. Policy entrepreneurs, therefore, distinguish themselves from other policy actors 
through their attempts to bring about a fundamental reorienting of public policy, as 
well as potentially reshaping the policymaking context in which this change occurs. 
Policy entrepreneurs may be located in various contexts and institutional settings 
involved in the policy process. As Kingdon (1984) states, policy entrepreneurs:
could be in or out of government, in elected or appointed positions, in 
interest groups or research organizations. But their deining characteristic, 
much as in the case of a business entrepreneur, is their willingness to invest 
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their resources – time, energy, reputation, and sometimes money – in the 
hope of a future return. (p 122)
This account of policy entrepreneurship focuses on individuals (or groups of 
individuals) within collective entities such as civil society organisations or government. 
Yet it is also possible for institutions (legal persons) to have political agency. Bodies 
such as Departments of Health are often identiied as key policy actors within 
analyses of policy change in the domestic sphere in the same way that states are 
treated as collective actors within the discipline of international relations. Here, we 
view institutional actors such as the Department of Health, and even the Scottish 
government, as possessing agency – and thus as (potential) policy entrepreneurs 
– without attempting to disaggregate them into the key sub components (that is, 
units or directorates general) or the speciic individuals within them that are driving 
policy change. This is appropriate for the level of analysis presented here and is also 
in keeping with the guarantees of anonymity given to interviewees.
Policy windows may open up suddenly and unexpectedly and close again just as 
quickly. As policy windows open, policy actors must seize the opportunity presented 
for change to occur. At certain times, policy windows may open as a result of 
unexpected developments – which Kingdon terms focusing events – while at other 
times, they may result from more institutionalized aspects of the political cycle such as 
elections or budgets (see also Birkland (1997; 1998)). Policy entrepreneurs play a key 
role in ‘selling’ policies, ‘coupling’ the diferent streams and thus driving governance 
change (Bache, 2013); a process which Ackrill and Kay (2011) term ‘brokering’ (in 
contrast to their ‘advocacy’ function in the agenda-setting phase). As will be examined 
below, the example of MUP in England highlights how, even when factors align 
to open a policy window, policy change may not occur and the moment may pass.
Kingdon’s work represents a seminal contribution to the ield of policy studies, 
which has been applied to an increasing range of policy issues and decision-making 
arenas. The MSA has been the subject of several recent reviews (Ackrill and Kay, 2011; 
Cairney and Jones, 2016; Jones et al, 2016; Rawat and Morris, 2016) and a special 
edition of a leading public policy journal mapping the state of the literature (see Béland 
and Howlett, 2016). Here we conine ourselves to discussing speciic aspects of the 
MSA and its employment in the ield of policy studies as it relates to the present case.
The empir ical application of the MSA has been extended from the 
agenda-setting phase (where Kingdon saw its relevance) to the entire policymaking and 
implementation process (Zahariadis, 2003; Exworthy and Powell, 2004; Ridde, 2009; 
Howlett et al, 2015; Boswell and Rodrigues, 2016; Rawat and Morris, 2016). As it has 
expanded from its initial focus on US politics the approach has been reined and developed 
to take account of diferent policy contexts – for example, the greater openness of polities 
outside the US to external stimuli and events (Cairney and Jones, 2016). This includes 
studies of policymaking within the EU (Zahariadis, 2003; 2008; Ackrill and Kay, 2011; 
Ackrill et al, 2013; Bache, 2013). In complex, multi-level polities such as the EU, policy 
ideas may spread rapidly across diferent policy settings and decision-making forums. The 
application of the MSA to the EU has led scholars to engage with issues of overlapping 
or ambiguous policy competence and the policy ‘spillover’ from one setting to another 
(Exworthy and Powell, 2004; Ridde, 2009; Ackrill and Kay, 2011; Ackrill et al, 2013; 
Bache, 2013; Bache and Reardon, 2013; Zahariadis, 2013). Indeed, in the updated second 
edition of Agendas and Alternatives, Kingdon (2003) himself recognised the potential for 
D
el
iv
er
ed
 b
y 
In
ge
nt
a
IP
 : 
5.
10
.3
1.
21
1 
O
n:
 T
ue
, 2
0 
O
ct
 2
02
0 
16
:2
4:
01
C
op
yr
ig
ht
  T
he
 P
ol
ic
y 
P
re
ss
Policy windows and multiple streams
319
‘spillover’ between policy settings via ‘demonstration efects’. As Ackrill and Kay (2011) 
comment: ‘If a policy issue occupies multiple institutionally connected policy arenas, a 
policy decision taken in one arena may impact directly on policy decisions in others, 
even forcing a decision when none otherwise would be made’ (p 73).
Boswell and Rodrigues (2016) argue that the focus of studies in this context has 
been largely top-down versus bottom-up, with the MSA being employed to explain 
how policies developed by a central government ilter down to, or are implemented by, 
lower levels. This relects the far larger number of studies employing the MSA which 
focus on the national or federal level of decision making versus lower (sub-national) 
levels of governance (Rawat and Morris, 2016). Others have suggested that policy 
entrepreneurship may be more efective at lower levels (Henstra, 2011; Oborn et al, 
2011; Dudley, 2013). Exworthy and Powell (2004), meanwhile, have highlighted not 
just the vertical connections between governance levels but horizontal connections 
and the need for alignment between policy actors at the same level (for example, 
diferent government ministries) to facilitate policy change.
In the context of UK public health debates, Cairney (2007a) identiied both 
top-down (from the EU) and bottom-up (from the devolved administrations) 
inluence on the UK government’s tobacco policies relating to advertising and smoke 
free environments, with the Scottish government leading the rest of the UK toward 
smoke-free public spaces (see also Cairney (2007b)). These studies exist within a larger 
literature on the shifting dynamic of UK policy since devolution (see, for example, 
Bache and Flinders (2004); Keating et al (2009)).
Alongside the focus on policy ‘spillover’ and multi-level governance, scholars have 
highlighted the role of knowledge transfer within the process of policy development (see, 
for example, Shaxson et al (2012); Oliver et al (2014); Hawkins and Parkhurst (2016)) 
and argued for the relevance of this literature to the MSA. Cairney (2011) has suggested 
the concept of a ‘policy transfer window’ as a means of combining the insights from the 
two literatures in order to add greater depth to our understanding of the way in which 
external (knowledge) stimuli may afect policy development. While not working with 
the MSA framework, Mavrot and Sager (2018) have identiied the way in which speciic 
forms of vertical knowledge transfer occur in multi-level polities such as Switzerland.
This literature is of relevance to the present article given the speciic constitutional 
context in which the MUP debates occurred; namely, the UK’s asymmetric system 
of devolution in which policy developments in Westminster – afecting England and 
the UK as a whole – are closely linked to, and inluenced by, developments in the 
devolved administrations (and vice versa). Furthermore, the debate on MUP was 
framed explicitly in terms of the underlying evidence base for alcohol related harms 
and the need for efective alcohol policy.
The analysis presented below draws on 26 semi-structured interviews conducted 
by the irst author with policy actors in London and Edinburgh between February 
and October 2018. Respondents included current and former policymakers within 
the Scottish and UK governments, representatives of public health bodies, alcohol 
NGOs and other policy actors identiied via stakeholder mapping and purposive 
and snowball sampling. Industry actors were not interviewed for this study for a 
number of reasons including uncertainties about access and the additional complexity 
anticipated in the data in light of our previous studies. An important implication of 
this decision is that the dataset is restricted to perceptions of industry actors as held 
by other actors. However, it is possible to understand the dynamics of the MUP 
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debate through triangulation of interviewees from diferent sectors. Interviews were 
recorded, transcribed and analysed using established qualitative research methods (see 
Braun and Clarke (2006); Rubin and Rubin (2012); Brinkmann (2013)). A two-stage 
process of thematic coding was undertaken by the irst author in liaison with the 
second author who reviewed transcripts independently to identify key topics and 
themes prior to their reinement in subsequent analyses.
The ‘problem’ stream
The entry of MUP on to the policy agenda in England was the result of a series of 
developments within the policy stream driven by important interventions from the 
research, advocacy and policy communities in both England and Scotland (Holden 
and Hawkins, 2012; Hawkins and Holden, 2014). Alcohol harms have long been 
acknowledged as a policy problem requiring governmental intervention in a series 
of policy documents from governments of diferent political colours in England 
and Scotland. For example, most UK government administrations in the 1970s 
and 1980s published such documents in response to rising levels of alcohol harms 
(Baggott, 1990). More recently in England, the ‘New’ Labour government’s Alcohol 
Harm Reduction Strategy for England (AHRSE) ofered the irst cross-departmental 
strategic response, and was followed by Safe, Sensible, Social (Room, 2004; Anderson, 
2007). Both these documents eschewed the prevailing research consensus on the most 
efective, population level approaches to tackling harm (reductions in availability, price 
increases and regulation of advertising and promotion) (see Babor et al (2010)). Instead, 
measures such as public information campaigns and co-regulatory schemes, which are 
unsupported by evidence but strongly favoured by industry actors, were central to the 
policy approach they set out (Hawkins and Holden, 2013). In the period up to 2008, 
a similar policy approach was also evident in Scotland (see Scottish Executive (2007)). 
Thus, while successive governments in both contexts acknowledged the extent of 
alcohol related harms and accepted their responsibility to address these, they consistently 
failed to adopt those policy measures which would most efectively achieve their stated 
objectives (Hawkins et al, 2012). The prevailing policy regimes were seen instead to 
relect industry preferences (Room, 2004; Anderson, 2007; McCambridge, 2012).
The policy documents relect a conceptualization of alcohol related harm as limited 
to a minority of problematic drinkers, who should be targeted by policy. Furthermore, 
it identiies the responsibility for this problem as lying with the individual consumer 
who should be encouraged (via public information or advice) or coerced (via the 
criminal justice system) to change their drinking behaviour. The alcohol related harms 
most prominently targeted are those associated with heavy episodic drinking rather 
than the long-term health and social consequences of heavy drinking. This approach 
minimises perceptions that alcohol harms extend across society and that the population 
as a whole reducing consumption will reduce levels of a wide range of alcohol related 
health and social harms, as indicated by the available evidence (Babor et al, 2010). The 
long-term success of this approach to alcohol policy in England – notwithstanding the 
evidence available on both the nature of the problem and the responses – is indicative 
of the efectiveness of industry inluencing strategies. These include industry actors 
developing long-term relationships with government and positioning themselves as key 
policy stakeholders (Baggott, 1990; 2010; Hawkins et al, 2012; Hawkins and Holden, 
2014; McCambridge et al, 2014; Nicholls and Greenaway, 2015).
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After devolution in 1999, this policy approach was largely mirrored in Scotland under 
the Labour–Liberal Democrat coalition administrations (Scottish Executive, 2007). This 
situation changed dramatically with the election of a Scottish National Party (SNP) 
government in 2007 (Holden and Hawkins, 2012) and the subsequent publication of 
their alcohol strategy (Scottish Government, 2008). The strategy documents recognised 
the scale of alcohol related harms as a policy problem requiring population-level 
policy responses including MUP.  MUP is a whole population measure in the sense 
that it afects the price of alcohol and inluences alcohol consumption in the general 
population, because overall demand (and thus harm) reduces as price increases. However, 
MUP can also be said to be a targeted measure as not all products are afected by it, 
and inexpensive high strength products were of particular concern. For example, the 
prices of very few drinks sold in on-licence premises will change as a result of MUP. 
Instead, it afects those cheap drinks, which are high in alcohol content, and are sold 
in supermarkets and other of-licence premises (that is, for consumption elsewhere) 
which will be required to be sold at higher prices. MUP subtly changes the deinition 
of the problem with which policy contends; it may also change the use of evidence 
and the balance of power between competing sets of policy actors.
The ‘policy’ stream
The publication of the 2008 Scottish alcohol strategy represented an important break 
from previous policy regimes which were insuicient to address alcohol related harms 
and to achieve the stated desire of governments across the UK of reducing them. 
Developments in the problem stream around the understanding of alcohol related 
harms went hand in hand with – indeed were dependent on – the identiication of, 
and advocacy for, new forms of policy response able to address the alcohol problem so 
deined. It would be misleading to see MUP simply as a policy response to changing 
perceptions of the nature of alcohol related harms. Rather, new understandings of 
the alcohol problem and its putative solution were coproduced within concurrent 
and mutually imbricated developments within the policy and problem streams. The 
development of MUP as a policy intervention required alcohol related harms to 
be reframed and reconstructed as a diferent kind of policy problem requiring that 
particular solution (Katikireddi et al, 2014a).
The development of MUP as a viable, evidence-informed policy option was the 
result of developments in both England and Scotland and of cooperation between 
policy actors in each setting. The irst modelling of the efects of the price-based 
interventions in the UK, including MUP, was commissioned by the Department 
of Health (DH) in London and undertaken by researchers at the University of 
Sheield School of Health and Related Research (ScHARR) (Brennan et al, 2008). 
This was later supplemented by additional analyses from the same team (Meng et 
al, 2012; Brennan et al, 2014; Angus et al, 2016). The Sheield modelling played a 
vital role in bringing MUP onto the policy agenda in Scotland, providing policy 
advocates and policymakers with additional evidence to support their positions and 
justify decisions taken (Katikireddi et al, 2016). The Sheield model also relects 
interest in, and openness to, pricing as an important policy lever by oicials within 
the DH alcohol policy team who commissioned the work, as well as their wider 
understanding of the limitations of previous policies in tackling the sheer scale of 
the alcohol problem.
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Drawing on the Sheield modelling, and in liaison with colleagues in England, 
alcohol policy advocates in Scotland succeeded in explicitly changing the framing 
of policy debates to the whole-population approach (Hawkins and Holden, 2013; 
Katikireddi et al, 2014a). In so doing, they reconceptualised the nature of alcohol policy 
problems facing the UK and the appropriate policy responses. These developments 
in the problem and policy streams were the irst step in opening a window of 
opportunity for a fundamental reorientation of alcohol policy away from industry-
favoured approaches and towards price-based and other population-level measures 
initially in Scotland, and subsequently elsewhere in the UK.
This laid the foundation for policy entrepreneurs to bring forward concrete 
proposals to adopt price-based interventions and created a window of opportunity 
for policy change to occur. The election of an SNP government for the irst time 
since devolution served as a focusing event in the policy’s development (Holden and 
Hawkins, 2012). This led to a rebalancing of the role of the industry and public health 
actors within the alcohol policy process and the subsequent adoption of MUP by the 
incoming administration (Holden and Hawkins, 2012). Following developments in 
Scotland, MUP soon emerged as the key alcohol policy focus elsewhere in the UK.
The ‘political’ stream
While the problem and policy streams developed symbiotically in Scotland and 
England – as a result of the close links between government, researchers and civil 
society actors in each setting – signiicant divergence was evident in the political 
stream. While the introduction of MUP in Scotland enjoyed sustained political 
commitment by key policy actors across the Scottish government, the policy lacked 
similar political support in England. In addition, the MUP debate in England took 
place within a complex and highly politicised policy context in which other policy 
agendas were being pursued in diferent parts of government.
The inclusion of MUP in the government alcohol strategy
The Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition government was formed following 
the UK general election in May 2010, which the two parties had contested on the 
basis of very diferent approaches to alcohol policy. While the Liberal Democrats 
had committed to ‘support a ban on below-cost selling’, and were ‘in favour of 
the principle of minimum pricing’ (Liberal Democrats, 2010), the Conservatives 
had signalled their intention of reforming alcohol policy, and public health policy 
more generally (The Conservative Party, 2010). In opposition, Andrew Lansley, the 
incoming Secretary of State for Health, had convened a Public Health Commission 
involving health NGOs and industry actors, including the alcohol sector (Unilever, 
2009). This partnership-based, co-regulatory approach formed the blueprint for the 
coalition’s PHRD, introduced in 2011 (Department of Health, 2011). This lagship 
public health policy was launched as a policy priority in March 2011, just ten months 
after the general election, in the absence of an overarching alcohol strategy. The 
2010 coalition agreement had included a commitment to ban below cost sales of 
alcohol and to ‘review alcohol taxation and pricing’, while underlining the need not 
to ‘unfairly penalise’ moderate drinkers (HM Government, 2010). This reference to 
alcohol pricing had appeared to relect a compromise position closer to the Liberal 
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Democrat perspective. The PHRD, however, placed voluntary, partnership-based 
approaches with industry at the very heart of the alcohol policy agenda.
The adoption of MUP by the UK government in Westminster was unforeseen by 
many actors across government and the NGO sector, as had been the earlier decision 
to bring forward an alcohol strategy in any form. Asked about how they became 
aware of plans for a new alcohol strategy, one civil servant observed:
John Healey [then Shadow Secretary of State for Health] challenged Andrew 
Lansley about this in the House of Commons to say are you actually 
developing an Alcohol Strategy? When is it going to come out? And to 
everyone’s surprise, Andrew Lansley said we’re going to bring one out as 
soon as possible, and that was news to all civil servants.
Even when it became clear that there would be a new strategy, alcohol policy NGOs 
were circumspect about their chances of getting MUP onto the agenda:
We were told, in the run up to the publication of the Government’s Alcohol 
Strategy, that minimum pricing was just of the table. [...] MUP was deinitely 
not being loated as a serious idea, until it was announced by David Cameron, 
and it took us all by surprise.
The fact the policy was not widely trailed before its announcement meant that not 
just policymakers, but the wider policy community were unprepared for its landing. 
Health NGOs and advocates which would be expected to support the policy 
and defend it publicly had not had the opportunity develop coherent media and 
inluencing strategies around the announcement. This was crucial in a context in 
which the public still needed to be convinced about the merits of the policy. As one 
government actor commented: “to a certain extent the alcohol ield weren’t ready 
for [MUP’s] inclusion and the public weren’t either”.
It was consistently reported by interviewees that it was a personal decision of 
the Prime Minister, David Cameron, to include MUP in the alcohol strategy. One 
respondent suggested that the Prime Minister was motivated by concern for the 
underlying issues:
I think that Cameron had been convinced by the evidence, and I think that 
some of the Special Advisors in Number 10, have been convinced by the 
evidence, as well […]. David Cameron, seemingly, took that decision on his 
own. He didn’t have cross-Cabinet support for it.
However, the surprise nature of the inclusion of MUP in the strategy, and the lack 
of trailing in advance suggests that this was a decision taken without extensive 
consultation by the former Prime Minister, and without appreciating the degree 
of political commitment needed to see the policy through to implementation. In 
keeping with this analysis, MUP stood out from the remainder of the content of the 
new alcohol policy, as it alone embraced a whole population perspective on reducing 
alcohol harms (McCambridge, 2012). Despite much speculation about the timing 
and rationale for the inclusion of MUP in the GAS, one governmental actor candidly 
stated: “I am as baled now as I was then that it suddenly got included”.
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A lack of political commitment
MUP in England lacked political support within government and had no champions at 
senior ministerial levels prepared to drive through such a controversial measure against 
strong opposition. Despite the personal role played by David Cameron in getting 
MUP into the alcohol strategy, he failed to ofer the ongoing public endorsement 
for the policy provided by Nicola Sturgeon in Scotland.
A similar lack of support was also evident at ministerial level within both DH and 
the Home Oice: the departments jointly responsible for the delivery of the alcohol 
strategy, and thereby MUP. As one public health respondent familiar with the policy 
commented:
I noticed that, after the day it was announced, I don’t think I saw another 
government minister speak in favour of minimum pricing […] there was 
no senior member of the government speaking for the policy, which, when 
you’ve got something that controversial […] there was no one making that 
argument. That was why it felt to me this policy just didn’t have a future 
because there was no one advocating for it.
Health Secretary, Andrew Lansley – the key architect of the PHRD – was vehemently 
opposed to MUP, making its introduction under the leadership of DH problematic. 
Partly as a result of Lansley’s opposition to MUP, the Home Oice assumed increasing 
responsibility for drafting the GAS and for the subsequent consultation for which 
Home Secretary Theresa May provided the ministerial foreword (as David Cameron 
had done for the GAS itself). However, May was little more positively inclined towards 
MUP than Lansley and provided negligible support for the policy. This is evident in 
the words of one Scottish government actor involved in liaising with Westminster 
on alcohol policy:
We ended up having not nil contact with the Home Oice […] but the 
political management of the Home Oice […] were not sympathetic to 
minimum unit price to the point where [Theresa May] stopped her own 
oicials going to meetings.
Unlike in DH, the lack of support for MUP, and the absence of a champion within 
the department, was evident not just at ministerial level, but among Home Oice 
oicials. This is due in part at least to the policy focus of the Home Oice on public 
order, with the beneits of MUP more apparent in long-term health outcomes. As 
one government respondent commented:
MUP as a policy, I don’t think it’s bought into. […] I don’t think they 
understand what it actually is or what it’s trying to achieve and who it will 
afect.
This confusion about the nature and purposes of MUP was evident in the framing of 
its objectives in the GAS in terms of binge drinking and public order issues, as well as 
in David Cameron’s foreword. Appreciation of the efectiveness of MUP in addressing 
the long-term health consequences, as well as the short-term intoxication-related 
dangers, of drinking was weak outside DH. The gradual shift of responsibility for the 
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alcohol strategy from DH to the Home Oice meant that the policy emerged in the 
context of an absence of political ownership of the policy and considerable institutional 
uncertainty. Outside of the civil servants in DH who had been intimately involved in 
the policy’s development, including in commissioning key research that underpinned 
it, levels of understanding of, and support for, the policy across government were weak.
The policy window closing
Following publication of the 2012 GAS, the Home Oice held a public consultation 
on the level of MUP, with 45p per unit of alcohol initially proposed for consideration. 
The consultation ran for ten weeks from 28 November 2012, and the government’s 
response was published in July 2013 following signiicant delays. The consultation 
was not designed to address the question of whether or not to introduce MUP in 
England, but the level at which it should be set. However, the submissions made by 
industry actors went far beyond the remit of the consultation – on the level of the 
MUP – and questioned the rationale behind the policy as part of a wider strategy 
to oppose its introduction (Gornall, 2014; Hawkins and McCambridge, 2014). 
Moreover, the Home Oice minister making the announcement used responses 
to the consultation as a rationale to discontinue its stated plan to introduce MUP 
(Browne, 2013).
During the consultation period, there was the apparent shift within government 
towards the introduction of a ban on below cost selling of alcohol as an alternative 
to MUP; a policy that was known to be less efective than the latter (Brennan et al, 
2014). As one of the researchers at the University of Sheield involved in the alcohol 
price modelling commented:
And at some point [the Home Oice] started asking questions about the 
ban on sales below VAT and duty. So, we knew at that point that there was 
certainly being a consideration that minimum pricing might be dropped. 
[…] There was a gradual transition over time where it became apparent we 
knew that minimum pricing wasn’t going to happen.
The decision to move forwards with a ban on below cost sales represented a subtle 
redeinition of the problem. For example, a Home Oice source commented:
I think the industry recognised that Ministers wanted to regulate, to remove 
the worst examples of loss leading sales of alcohol. It certainly didn’t mean that 
if we did ban below cost sales then minimum unit pricing was deinitively of 
the table and it was never presented as, we will do this but we won’t do MUP.
This policy drift is indicative also of the general trend in government policy in this 
period away from ‘progressive’ issues (such as the environment, social exclusion 
and public health), which had characterised David Cameron’s leadership of the 
Conservatives in opposition and his early years as Prime Minister, towards a more 
traditionally Conservative policy agenda. This shift in direction coincided with the 
recruitment by Mr Cameron of Australian political strategist, Lynton Crosby, to 
manage the Conservatives’ electoral strategy in November 2012; after the adoption 
of MUP in the GAS in March 2012 and before the policy’s discontinuation in July 
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2013. This reorientation was encapsulated in the words attributed to Mr Crosby 
that his aim was to ‘get the barnacles of the boat’ (Watt, 2013). This included not 
just MUP but also standardised cigarette packaging, although the latter decision was 
ultimately reversed (Hawkins et al, 2019).
The absence of MUP measures from the government’s legislative programme 
announced in the Queen’s Speech in May 2013 fuelled speculation that the policy 
had been abandoned. In July 2013, it was the Liberal Democrat Home Oice 
Minister Jeremy Browne (2013) who announced to Parliament that the government 
would not bring forward plans to implement MUP, citing the need for greater 
supporting evidence of its efectiveness and the need to protect the interests of 
moderate drinkers:
There has been much speculation about the Government’s plans in relation 
to minimum unit pricing. That policy will remain under consideration, 
but it will not be proceeded with at this time. We do not yet have enough 
concrete evidence that its introduction would be efective in reducing 
harms associated with problem drinking – this is a crucial point – without 
penalising people who drink responsibly. We will tackle the most egregious 
examples of cheap alcohol by banning sales of alcohol below the level of 
alcohol duty plus value-added tax.
The statement claiming insuicient evidence contradicted the earlier view of the 
evidence supporting MUP in the GAS, while the evidence in support of MUP had 
strengthened in the meantime (Stockwell et al, 2012; Zhao et al, 2013). Browne’s 
(2013) announcement was framed explicitly as an opportunity for industry actors to 
ill the policy void through self-regulatory measures, and was linked to the Department 
of Health’s Responsibility Deal Alcohol Network (RDAN):
Our decision not to proceed with the introduction of minimum unit pricing 
at this stage gives the alcohol industry an opportunity to demonstrate what 
more it can do to reduce the harms associated with problem drinking. Our 
challenge to the industry is to increase its eforts, building on what has already 
been achieved through the public health responsibility deal. That includes 
improving education to promote safer drinking, reducing the availability of 
the high-strength products that cause the most harm for problem drinkers, 
and responsible marketing and product placement.
Respondents identiied a range of factors that contributed to the decision not to 
bring forward measures to implement MUP. One respondent attributed the decision 
to opposition among Liberal Democrat MPs, including Browne himself, whose 
constituencies included cider-producing regions in the South-West of England. 
Others identiied key Home Oice oicials, and ministerial aides, as playing a key 
role in the form and content of the 2013 announcement. Speciic claims that the 
statement was amended to downplay the supporting evidence for MUP following 
interventions from ministerial special advisors within the Home Oice formed the 
basis of a complaint by a former civil servant to the Civil Service Commission, which 
was rejected in October 2017 (Civil Service Commission, 2017).
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The government was also concerned about the legality of MUP in the context 
of ongoing challenges to the policy in Scotland. As one civil servant commented:
I think Ministers understandably wanted to see how that case ran and played 
out before committing to introducing minimum unit pricing in England and 
Wales. That was the immediate reaction to that, you know that we should 
just pause, not take it of the table but just wait and see how that ran.
The uncertainty about the inal outcome of the Scottish legal case was given also 
as the rationale for not setting out a timetable for revisiting the policy, a decision 
which meant that while the introduction of MUP formally remained government 
policy, there was little prospect of it being introduced in the foreseeable future. As 
the previous respondent continued:
[W]e were quite careful at the time not to tie ourselves to a timeframe in 
terms of when we were going to then bring minimum unit pricing back 
on the table or, if indeed, we were going to do that at all, because there was 
still a chance that the policy would be struck down in the Courts, it would 
be taken of the agenda in Scotland. I think the other thing that it did was 
create an opportunity for the industry to step up and do more. This was 
something that was in our thinking at the time.
Following the inal ruling in the Scottish MUP case by the UK Supreme Court, 
there have been no further developments on MUP in England brought about by 
government. This relects the controversial nature of the policy and the lack of 
political commitment to it in the Conservative government. Moreover, by the time 
of the ruling, the UK’s decision to leave the EU and the ongoing Brexit negotiations 
absorbed political focus and energy. This meant that even high priority issues have 
been left in stasis. A Health and Social Care Select Committee (2018) enquiry briely 
reconsidered the issue in a one-day hearing in January 2018, but there appears to be 
little early prospect that measures to enact MUP will be brought forward.
Discussion and conclusion
The case presented here demonstrates the ability of ‘spillover’ to occur between policy 
settings within the UK, but also both limits to, and the complex nature of, these 
processes. The failure to enact MUP in England, following legislation in Scotland 
demonstrates the importance of high-level political commitment to controversial 
policy issues – even those with strong supporting evidence and a precedent for the 
introduction in related settings. In addition, it highlights the important role that 
civil society actors can play, not just by bringing policy issues onto the agenda and 
promoting policy responses, but by supporting government decisions to pursue these 
measures once announced. The Westminster government did not trail its decision to 
introduce MUP in advance and thus undermined the ability of civil society bodies 
to support their policy.
The multiple streams model of the policy process provides a valuable conceptual 
framework through which to explain the adoption of MUP in England in March 2012 
and the subsequent decision in July 2013 not to move forward with implementation 
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of the policy. The introduction of MUP in England was facilitated, in the problem 
and policy streams, by an iterative, symbiotic process of problem deinition and 
policy development which occurred through a collaboration between researchers, 
advocates and policy actors in both England and Scotland. This included the policy 
entrepreneurship of oicials in the DH in London bringing price-based measures 
onto the policy agenda by commissioning the initial modelling of price interventions 
by the University of Sheield.
In the political stream, the policy process in England and Scotland diverged 
signiicantly. As documented previously, MUP enjoyed strong and enduring political 
commitment at the highest levels of government in Scotland in the face of signiicant 
opposition from powerful vested interests in the alcohol industry (see Holden and 
Hawkins (2012; 2018); Katikireddi et al (2014a)), which was crucial in seeing the policy 
through to implementation in May 2018. This underlines the key role of political 
agency in policy development. While often unforeseen and unpredictable circumstances 
(‘focusing events’) may lead policy windows to open, the commitment of policy actors is 
needed to grasp the opportunities provided by the window and to efect policy change.
While developments in Edinburgh created normative pressure for the Westminster 
government to follow suit on MUP, public health actors saw little prospect of this 
occurring under the coalition government. Even key government actors were 
unprepared for its adoption in the 2012 alcohol strategy. The lack of forewarning about 
the policy announcement meant pro-MUP advocates were unable to give efective 
support to such a controversial measure. This support was needed to insulate it (and 
the government proposing it) from the obvious challenges which would come from 
the industry. Ministerial support for the policy was lacking in DH and the Home 
Oice: the two government departments most closely involved with alcohol policy. 
Moreover, while oicials in DH had played a crucial role in the emergence of MUP 
in the policy stream, their attention had been directed irmly towards other policy 
initiatives, namely the RDAN, which were associated personally with the Secretary 
of State for Health, Andrew Lansley. Within the Home oice, the problem of alcohol 
related harm, and thus the relevant policy responses, were viewed through the lens 
of law and order, rather than health: a set of issues which MUP was not primarily 
designed to address (Hawkins and McCambridge, 2019).
Responsibility for the adoption of MUP was attributed to David Cameron 
personally, demonstrating the ability of key political actors to shape policy agendas. Yet 
the failure to see the policy through to implementation demonstrates the limitations 
of political agency at even the highest levels, particularly in the absence of key allies. 
Dropping MUP was one aspect of the wider shift in political orientation within 
David Cameron’s government from late 2012, leaving the policy without a champion 
in government and thus its survival is unlikely.
The main contribution of this article is to ofer an explanation of the failure of 
MUP in England informed by key theories from the ield of policy studies. However, 
the analysis presented here also makes an important theoretical contribution to the 
existing literature on the MSA. It deepens our understanding of the MSA through 
its application to a new policy issue and policymaking context: alcohol policy in the 
context of the UK’s system of asymmetric devolution. The MSA has ofered important 
insights into developments at all stages of the policy process and helps explain both 
convergence and divergence between England and Scotland. In so doing, it builds 
on existing studies of the MSA in multi-level governance systems.
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The article provides an additional case study of sub-national policymaking via the 
MSA (that is, alcohol policy in England within the wider UK context and the inluence 
of Scotland on this) (Ackrill and Kay, 2011; Rawat and Morris, 2016). Rather than 
policy spillover occurring mainly in a top down process from central government 
(Boswell and Rodrigues, 2016), this study indicates that policy development, in the 
problem and policy stream at least, occurs in a symbiotic or mutually constitutive 
way between levels of government. The divergence observed between the political 
stream in England and Scotland is in keeping with previous indings that policy 
entrepreneurship can be more efective at lower levels of governance (Henstra, 2011; 
Oborn et al, 2011; Dudley, 2013). However, this inding must be qualiied. While the 
policy entrepreneurship in the political stream emanated clearly from Scotland, this is 
not strictly the case in the problem and policy streams in which there was extensive 
collaboration between policy actors north and south of the border, including the key 
role played by DH-commissioned research in identifying MUP as a viable policy 
approach.
Notwithstanding the speciicities of the UK system of devolution – meaning 
they may not be fully applicable to more developed or clearly delineated federal 
systems – the indings presented here are of relevance to the wider development of 
the literature on MSA and multi-level governance. The present study adds to those 
of Exworthy and Powell (2004), which concluded that policy change is most likely 
where there is alignment both vertically between diferent levels of governance and 
horizontally between policy actors. This is the case within the problem and policy 
streams in which policy actors achieved greater success in advancing the policy 
agenda. Divergence occurred between Scotland and England within the political 
stream, where only the former enacted the proposed measures.
Our analysis also demonstrates that, in the case of alcohol pricing policy, it 
is impossible to disaggregate fully the development of the problem and policy 
streams in the MUP debate in an analytically meaningful way. While the concepts 
of problem stream and policy stream are useful heuristic devices, the development 
of policy problems and their solutions were not separate, sequential phases of the 
policy process; they often overlapped and, in some instances, were even mutually 
constitutive. This was the case with the development of MUP and the emergence 
onto the policy agenda of the whole population model of alcohol harm on which 
it depends.
The framing of the nature, extent and causes of alcohol related harm facing the 
UK (the problem stream), and the proposed responses needed to address these 
problems (the policy stream), emerged iteratively as mutually reinforcing policy frames. 
This study shows that wider contextual factors are also important in analysing the 
development of policy processes, and the symbiotic nature of the developments in 
Scotland and England are noteworthy in this regard. Moreover, it is what key political 
actors do when policy windows open that determines whether policy change occurs.
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